Abstract-We consider while language programs with variables of two security types: low and high. Security static analysis of information flows of such programs identifies insecure information flows which can cause leaks. Semantic rules of such an analysis which was proposed in [6] assign security types for expressions, statements and compositions of statements. We use these rules to propose an algorithm of security static analysis tries to discover a security type of the program under consider ation. If such a type can be assigned, information flows of the program are secure; otherwise, it con tains insecure information flows. We have used flex and bison [5] tools to implement a translator for a while language into the MMIX computer [2] instruction sequence.
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INTRODUCTION
Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end to end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end to end confi dentiality policy might assert that secret input variables cannot be inferred by an attacker through the attacker's observations of public variables; this policy regulates information flow. Information flow from the source to the receiver is the transformation of information in the receiver, which depends on the infor mation source [1] .
Conventional security mechanisms such as access control and encryption do not directly address the enforcement of information flow policies. Recently, a promising new approach has been developed [6] : the use of programming language techniques for specifying and enforcing information flow policies. One of the principal mechanisms for the realization of these goals is a static program analysis, which was dis cussed in detail in this paper on the example of simple language programs.
SEMANTICS
We consider programs written on the model language called while language. It is a kind of language presented in [4] . This language has skip, assignment, sequential composition, conditional and while loop constructs. We designate h and l for typical variables of high and low confidentiality, respectively.
In the process of program execution information flows occurs between the variables of different secu rity types. Secure information flows that do not lead to information leaks, have the property of noninter ference. Noninterference states that confidential variables may not interfere with (affect) public variables, in other words, no public variables do not change depending on the secret variables. If not all of informa tion flows in the program have the noninterference property, then the program is not secure. Thus, there is no information flows from secret variables to public variables in secure programs.
For the insecure information flows and programs identification the static analysis is used. Therein for each variable, each expression, statements and generally program is assigned the security type. Static anal ysis is based on the typing rules ( Fig. 1 ) collected in security type system [6] : rules describe what a security type is assigned to a program (or expression), based on the types of subprograms (subexpressions).
Consider the program presented in Fig. 2 , from the security of information flows viewpoint. The first program is secure because public variables change independently of secret variables. In the second pro 1 The article is published in the original.
gram the direct dependence of public variable of secret variable is visible: assignment to an open variable l value of h+1 contains an information flow from the secret variable to the public one, which means non observation of the noninterference policy. So program 2 is insecure. Consider program 3. It does not have direct information flows from secret variables to public ones but if we consider the condition and the body of the loop, it is possible to see that the public variable value changes depending on that of the secret vari able. Thus, the assignment l: = l + 1 depending on the value h is also a violation of the noninterference policy, so program 3 is not safe in terms of information flows. 
PROGRAM TYPING ALGORITHM
E1-2 [ ] | -exp : high h Vars exp ( ) ∉ |-exp : low C1-3 [ ] pc [ ] |-skip pc [ ] |-h := exp |-exp : low low [ ] |-l : exp C4-5 [ ] pc [ ] |-C 1 pc [ ] |-C 2 pc [ ] |-C 1 ; C 2 |-exp : pc pc [ ] |-C pc [ ] |-while exp do C C6-7 [ ] |-exp : pc pc [ ] |-C 1 pc [ ] |-C 2 pc [ ] |-if exp then C 1 else C 2 high [ ] |-C low [ ] |-C Fig
TRANSLATOR ALGORITHM
To implement the algorithm proposed in paragraph 3 the translator was developed. From the original language [4] , it is different in the introduction of security types for declared variables. The translator con verts a while language program in MMIX [2] machine code and statically analyzes it to detect insecure information flows. The translation problem is a well studied area of computer science [3] and its solution is the construc tion of two interacting components-lexical and syntactic analyzer. Modern software allow automating the time consuming process of code generation compiler, yet it requires the determination of the lexical and syntactic structure of a programming language. We have developed a set of regular expressions that describe the tokens of our programming language (eg, constants, identifiers, etc.), as well as LALR gram mar [3] specifying the syntax.
The implementation of the translator was performed by software flex and bison [5] . Flex generates a code for the lexical analyzer in C language based on patterns of tokens, which is closely integrated with the generated code parser created by bison. Bison input data are similar to the formalism of attribute gram mars [3] in which the executable code can correspond to the products. This code is executed, if given product is used in the construction of a parse tree.
Program Security Analysis
Safety analysis occurs during the parsing of the program. Rules for security analysis were realized for each product of the program. There are two security types of variables in this grammar: high and low. By default (if a security type is not specified) the low security type is assigned for variables.
An example that demonstrates the principle of the algorithm implementation is shown in Figure 3 . Notations like $1, $2 etc. in C code correspond to the symbols on the right side of product in the in order of their appearance, and the variable $$ correspond to the statement from the head of product. Each of such notations corresponds to the set of calculated attributes. The purpose of computing is the security attribute at the operator as a whole.
According to the algorithm proposed in paragraph 3 security type of statement skip is [high, low] . In code to this type the constant 3 corresponds (0-expression is nontypable; 1-the type of expression is low; 2-the type of expression is high). Similarly, the statement security type is calculated according to the given algorithm. If the security type of the variable with the name corresponding to ID is high, then the whole expression can be typed both high and low; if security type of that is low, then there are two possible options: if the type of nonterminal rexpression is high, then the whole assignment expression is not typable, otherwise the type of the expression is low.
MMIX Code Generation
As a target language we chose the assembly language MMIXAL. It runs on 64 bit RISK architecture of MMIX [2] which is similar to that of most modern systems.
For data storage and processing, the MMIX architecture has 2 64 memory locations, 256 general pur pose registers and 32 special ones. The MMIX machine memory is divided into two parts: user (program) memory space and operation system one. User space is divided by 4 segments 2 61 bytes each: the text seg ment, the data segment, the pool segment and the stack segment.
The problem is we have to store the data with different security attributes. Therefore, we divide it into two segments. The first segment serves for public data storage. The second one is for storing the secret data. Using this approach, we isolate the memory area with high security level from the other one. In order to physically provide the needed security we can use cryptography.
When we translate our source code to the MMIXAL language each command is replaced by the cor responding set of MMIXAL commands. Calculations are organized by the use of stacks, which in their turn are created in the beginning of each memory segment. Our realization allows dynamically embedded visibility areas: global variables memory is allocated at the base of the stack and each new visibility area entrance is created by the new stack element, containing local variables designated area, the exit zone for the visibility area deletes the corresponding element from the list.
To process the data we use the registers, this approach requires rational use. The MMIX architecture has enough general usage registers, which gives opportunity to the stack to process the data. While devel oping the translator we managed to produce the following algorithm:
1. The bottom of the stack is placed in the first register. 2. While performing the operations that lead to the data field, the data is plased at the top of the stack. 3. Unary operations are performed on the first element from the top of the stack. 4. Binary operations are performed on the first two elements from the top of the stack. 5. If the data at the top of the stack is not needed anymore, the data is pushed away.
Thus, the whole code is assembled based on the fragments of the MMIXAL code for the different oper ations of our chosen programming language. CONCLUSION This paper describes the task of information flows security analyses for the simple programming lan guage, we present the algorithm that allows the detection of data leaks from the secret variables to the pub lic ones. The translator for this language was developed based on the conducted theoretical research. It is available here [7] .
